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Dear Friends,
Boston and the region that it anchors have reached a profound turning point. Despite our strong and
diversified economy and enviable position as a global center for higher education and health care, we
face very serious challenges to our future success and wellbeing. Some of these challenges—such as the
loss of population due to the highest cost of living in the country—are a direct byproduct of our success.
Others are the result of dramatic changes in our business sector and increasing competition from other
cities in this country and abroad. 
Unlike many other major American cities, however, Boston’s ability to meet these challenges—its power
to shape its own destiny and stimulate the regional economy—is hamstrung by state-imposed legal limits
of “home rule” power. That is the major conclusion of this ambitious and detailed review of Boston’s
legal powers as compared with six American competitor cities, conducted by Harvard Law School profes-
sors Gerald Frug and David Barron, with the support of the Boston Foundation. 
No one would argue that the Commonwealth has a deep stake in Boston’s future and should play a major
role in shaping it. But the right balance needs to be struck. None of the other major cities surveyed are as
constrained in their ability to operate. As a result, Boston is unduly dependent on the property tax as a
revenue source—more than twice as much as any of the other cities. Boston leaders have decried this for
years, but this study makes perhaps the strongest argument to date that the Boston needs a more
balanced revenue structure, rather than more revenue per se, to better compete. 
What sets this study apart is its thorough and exhaustive scope and comparative nature amidst new global
competition. Competitor cities like Chicago are pursuing innovative development strategies, in large part,
because in Illinois the state presumes cities and towns have authority, unless expressly codified otherwise.
In Massachusetts, it’s just the opposite. Municipal leaders in other states would be bewildered by the
Byzantine process Massachusetts leaders need to follow to enact basic local laws and regulations.
The last time home rule was seriously examined in the Commonwealth was the 1960s. At the time, one of
the intended purposes of reform was to free the State Legislature from some of the minutiae of local affairs
to enable it to concentrate on more strategic policy matters. But because the Home Rule Amendment is so
restrictive, the Legislature still spends an inordinate amount of time on local matters.
The transformational changes in the global knowledge economy require the Commonwealth and its cities
and towns to update their antiquated legal relationship. Boston should not be subject to a legal structure
that was designed in a past era for a very different kind of urban center. It is no longer a city in decline, as
it was in the 1950s, when it surrendered a great deal of its power to the state. Instead, it is a vibrant and
sophisticated city that should have the option of operating within a structure which strengthens its ability
to compete with other cities in the United States and abroad—especially in a time when all cities are
scrambling to meet the changing demands of the 21st century.
I invite you to read this fascinating study of the home rule provisions that affect Boston’s ability to create
its future both in its executive summary form and in its complete full version that you can access at
www.bostonhomerule.org—and then to engage with us in a dialogue about what kind of structure
should be in place to give this city and the area that relies on it control over its own destiny and the most
prosperous future possible.
Sincerely, 
Paul S. Grogan
President and CEO
The Boston Foundation

Boston is an urban success story. It has emerged from
the financial crises of the 1950s and 1960s to become 
a diverse, vital, and economically powerful city.
Anchored by an outstanding array of colleges and
universities, world-class health care providers, leading
financial institutions, and numerous other assets,
today’s Boston drives the metropolitan economy and 
is one of the most exciting and dynamic cities in the
world. Boston is also a city at a crossroads, facing new
challenges bred by its own success, by changes in the
national and local economy, and by increased competi-
tion from cities across the country and around the
world. Unlike many of its competitors, Boston is not
gaining population. The high cost of housing, both 
within the city and in the metropolitan area, poses a
major threat to Boston’s ability to continue to attract
and retain workers whose innovation fuels the econ-
omy. There also remain serious inequities along racial
and class lines and the continuing task of improving
the city’s public schools in order to prepare the city’s
young people to participate in and contribute to the
city’s future. 
Yet the City of Boston lacks the power that other major
American cities enjoy to shape its own future. This
conclusion derives from an extensive and unprece-
dented review of Boston’s legal powers compared 
with those of six other major American cities: Atlanta,
Chicago, Denver, New York City, San Francisco, and
Executive Summary
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The City of Boston drives the nation’s fourth largest metropolitan area economy.
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Seattle. To perform this study, Harvard Law Professors
Gerald E. Frug and David J. Barron contracted with
prominent local government law scholars from across
the country to perform detailed investigations into the
legal status of the six other cities. The result is an enor-
mous wealth of compelling data that documents the
various ways in which Boston’s power is constrained
by the state to an extent that
is unique among the places
studied. 
It is hard to understand why
the Commonwealth should
want its major city—the
economic driver of its most
populous metropolitan
area—to be constrained 
in a way that comparable
cities in other states are not.
Like Boston, the other cities
in the report are large, economically influential actors
within their states and regions, have ethnically and
racially diverse populations, and are doing fairly well
when compared with other American cities. And, like
Boston, they all face substantial related challenges
occasioned by increasing suburban growth, significant
immigration, the persistence of concentrated poverty,
and an increasingly competitive global environment.
But there is no doubt that Boston, at present, is a city
bound—bound to an extent that none of the other
cities we examined is. 
The constraining legal structure that now governs
Boston forces the city to rely on a narrow revenue base,
limits the city’s ability to control its own expenditures,
and distorts the city’s efforts to plan. It also places the
city at a competitive disadvantage at a time when all
major cities are looking to deploy as many tools as
possible in order to secure their economic future. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Boston lost control over key parts of its infrastructure, including Logan Airport, to state authorities.
The City of Boston
lacks the power
that other major
American cities
enjoy to shape 
its own future.
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It has long been recognized
that Boston has limited legal
authority. In fact, city officials
have long complained about
the city’s lack of power, espe-
cially its restricted ability to
raise revenue. But the city’s
complaints have largely been
to no avail, in part because
the issue has so often been
framed in terms of the city’s
need to avert fiscal crises. As
long as requests for greater
home rule are made in
terms of Boston’s immediate
financial circumstances, its
complaints are likely to rein-
force the popular view that
city officials are simply trying
to avoid hard budgetary
choices. The report focuses, therefore, not on Boston’s
short-term budgetary circumstances, important though
they are, but on the city’s inability to make choices
about its own future, including about its future
revenue sources. 
Background on Home Rule
The state-imposed limits on Boston’s powers have
come in two major waves. The first wave spanned the
early to mid Twentieth Century. During this period,
the state twice revised the city’s charter and greatly
restricted the powers of the city to raise revenues,
borrow, and spend. These efforts were the byproduct
of the region’s unique political history and culture,
marked both by an exceptionally activist state legisla-
ture and sharp ethnically-motivated political rivalries
between the Yankee-dominated legislature (and busi-
ness community) and the Irish-controlled city. 
The second wave took place in the 1950s and 1960s
when the city elected to transfer key parts of its infra-
structure to the state to address the severe fiscal crises
of that time. Repeatedly during this period, the city
ceded important authority to the state in return for
additional access to funds or relief from burdensome
costs. It should be noted, however, that the city elected
to do so as a last resort after failing to gain back new
powers from the state that had been significantly
curtailed in the first wave. Whether the bargains made
during this time were wise ones is open to debate.
Boston became a national leader in redevelopment
during these years, and it was aided in that effort by
state measures that gave Boston additional powers in
return for giving up some old ones. But in important
respects, Boston emerged from the era of urban renewal
with less legal control over key parts of its city (with
some exceptions) than it had decades before. State-
created public authorities—and sometimes the state
itself—took over important city assets.
The other noteworthy event was an amendment of the
state constitution in the 1960s that gave home rule to
all cities and towns in the state, including Boston. Even
though the Home Rule Amendment to the Massachu-
setts Constitution appears to grant broad powers to 
all localities in the state, it explicitly exempts taxing,
borrowing, the regulation of private and civil affairs,
and municipal elections from its scope. Moreover,
under the Home Rule Amendment, Boston can bring
order on its own to the current jumble of statutes that
constitute its charter only by placing the whole of its
governmental structure in the hands of a separately
elected charter commission. Such a process gives city
officials little incentive to push for charter reform.
Additionally, the decisions of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court reflect a judicial inclination 
to treat the grant of home rule power narrowly rather
than as a broad affirmation of local self-governance.
There is, of course, more to a city’s legal power than
the protections contained in state grants of home rule.
Other aspects of state law can expand or contract city
powers in ways that the terms of a home rule amend-
ment might conceal. Still, state home rule provisions
are important in and of themselves. The legal defini-
tions set forth in provisions such as the Home Rule
Amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution play 
an important role in creating an ethos of home rule 
that either presumes city power or city powerlessness. 
Unfortunately, many of this report’s central findings
concern the powerlessness from which Boston suffers
in comparison to many of its key competitor cities.
The constraining
legal structure 
that now governs
Boston forces 
the city to rely 
on a narrow
revenue base…
and distorts 
the city’s 
efforts to plan. 
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Boston’s ability to shape its own future is limited in
three important ways. The first is that Boston has a
much more limited grant of home rule power than
other major competitor cities. As a result, Boston’s 
ability to pursue bold initiatives on its own authority 
is severely restricted. The second problem is that the
current legal structure is unusually constraining when
it comes to local fiscal discretion. State law makes
Boston exceptionally dependent on a limited number 
of revenue sources, most conspicuously the property
tax. As a result, Boston’s efforts to plan for its future 
are artificially constrained by a need to ensure that its
development maximizes a single, state-selected revenue
source. This restriction distorts the kind of open and
innovative planning process that the state should be
encouraging Boston to pursue. The third problem is
that the current legal structure places limitations on the
city’s power to be creative in its approach to economic
development. This is due to the fact that state law
places important legal restrictions on innovative land
use planning tools and fragments the city’s control over
much of its infrastructure and territory. No other city 
in our study operates within a legal structure that has
this combination of restraints. As a result, no other city
seems as bound in facing its future as Boston does. 
Boston Has Limited 
Home Rule Power 
Home Rule Amendment. Because the Home Rule
Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution
exempts taxing, borrowing, the regulation of private
and civil affairs, and municipal elections from its
scope, Boston has less authority than the six other
major U.S. cities we examined in this report. For
example, the Illinois constitution grants municipali-
ties home rule powers that pertain to local matters
and then expressly defines them in an expansive fash-
ion.1 As a result, Chicago has the power to tax, the
power to borrow, and the power to “regulate for the
protection of the public health, safety, morals, and
welfare . ...”2 Moreover, the Illinois constitution
provides—as the Massachusetts Constitution does
not—that the “[p]owers and functions of home rule
units shall be construed liberally.”3 Consistent with
that instruction, the Illinois Supreme Court has
construed the grant of home rule to include the
power to regulate municipal elections, including 
the authority to require them
to be nonpartisan.4 None 
of the other cities operates
under a grant of home 
rule that exempts taxing,
borrowing, the regulation 
of private or civil affairs, 
and the regulation of 
municipal elections from 
its coverage. 
Preemption. The state’s
power to preempt local
lawmaking is also more
extensive in Massachusetts
than elsewhere. The Massa-
chusetts Home Rule Amend-
ment permits state statutes
to preempt local laws even in
the absence of a clear conflict
as long as the state is thought to have decided the
appropriate policy on the issue covered by the local
law. Since the areas in which the state has legislated
are diverse and comprehensive, this means that virtu-
ally any local regulation can be understood to trench
on some state policy. Other cities enjoy substantially
more protection from state laws. The Colorado consti-
tution specifically identifies Denver as a home rule
city and invests it with powers, including borrowing
powers, that the state courts have held are beyond
state control.5 As a result, Denver has successfully
challenged directly conflicting state statutes that
attempted to regulate municipal employment prac-
tices6 and to limit the city’s ability to impose sales
taxes for local purposes.7
The City Charter. Boston’s city charter is a patchwork
of special laws enacted by the state legislature.
Central Findings
The constraining
legal structure 
that now governs
Boston forces 
the city to rely 
on a narrow
revenue base…
and distorts the
city’s efforts 
to plan.
9B o s t o n  B o u n d
Although the Home Rule Amendment gives the 
city the power to enact a “home rule charter,” it has
chosen not do so and for good reason. The reason is
that, under state law, the city can bring order on its
own to the current jumble of statutes that constitute
its charter only by placing the whole of its govern-
mental structure in the hands of a separately elected
charter commission. State law enables the charter
commission to pursue an unlimited reform agenda
once established and, then, to submit its proposal for
an up-or-down vote by city residents. The city itself
has no role in the process. In limited instances, two-
thirds of the city council can propose a change that
voters can approve by referendum, but this too is
unwieldy and restrictive. Other state constitutional
home rule provisions are not nearly so rigid.
Colorado permits Denver’s city council to initiate
substantial charter reform efforts without establishing
an independent charter commission, and California
also permits its cities to propose charters without
resorting to a commission. Under Washington’s state
constitution, cities like Seattle may present voters
with an alternative to the elected charter commis-
sion’s proposal. In Denver and San Francisco, the
charter revision process has been a focal point of civic
debate and discussion about the city’s organization
and future.
The Impact on Civic Engagement. Because Boston 
operates under one of the nation’s more restrictive
home rule amendments, it is less able than other 
cities to develop the kind of popular participation
and energy necessary to promote active civic engage-
ment in local government. The absence of this kind 
Denver International Airport (1995) sits on land Denver annexed from a neighboring county.
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of civic involvement is more troubling than simply 
its diminishing the possibility of making a particu-
lar governmental reform. Given the fast pace of
economic and demographic change and the competi-
tion among cities nationally and worldwide, efforts 
to promote any possible future for the city are likely
to depend on an engaged civic sentiment. No doubt,
there is room now for significant innovation within
the city’s current legal structure. And it is equally
clear that city officials have been quite creative in
making the most of the authority that they currently
have. Nevertheless, the limited nature of the legal
structure exerts a drag on local action that is both
problematic and unusual. 
Boston’s Constrained 
Fiscal Structure Distorts the
Planning Process
Revenue Restraints. From taxing to borrowing to
imposing fees, Massachusetts state law gives Boston
comparatively little authority to raise local revenue. As
a result, Boston is exceptionally dependent on a limited
number of revenue sources, most notably the property
tax. The property tax provides more than half the city’s
total revenue and about three-quarters of its own-
source revenue, significantly more than any other city
in our study. Every other city in our study receives a
portion of its revenue from sales taxes. And every city,
other than Boston and Atlanta, receives a portion of its 
Chicago’s award-winning Millennium Park (2004), a 24.5 acre public-private partnership in the heart of the city.
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revenue from an income or an occupation tax. 
Because of these differences, the property tax in Seattle
accounts for only about a quarter of city’s general 
fund revenues, while the retail sales tax, business 
and occupation taxes, and utility taxes each provide
between 15 and 20 percent of the city’s general fund
revenues. Similarly, San Francisco raises more revenue
from a combination of other local taxes than from the
property tax while Atlanta and Chicago both receive,
in total, twice the revenue from a combination of other
local taxes than they get from the property tax. Like
Boston, Chicago has limits on the amount of property
taxes it can raise. But Chicago’s limits are self-imposed,
not imposed by the state. Chicago’s ability to exercise
this kind of self-restraint is important in itself, in 
that it signals to everyone
that the city has the ability 
to handle its own finances.
State Aid. In addition to its
dependence on property
taxes, Boston is unusually
reliant on state aid. For the
past decade, state aid has been the city’s second largest
source of revenue, providing about 20 to 30 percent 
of the city’s funding. Boston is by no means unique 
in terms of its reliance on state aid. New York City
receives about 30 percent of its revenue in the form 
of state grants. Other cities, however, are far less
dependent, particularly on state aid that is not
The Pike Place Market in Seattle, where retail sales tax provides up to one-fifth of the city’s general fund revenues.
Boston is 
unusually reliant 
on state aid.
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Targeted Taxes. The state has authorized Boston to
impose excise taxes on motor vehicles, hotels and
motels, and jet fuel. Its efforts to obtain legislative
authorization for other targeted taxes have been
unsuccessful. Other cities can impose these kinds of
taxes themselves because they have home rule author-
ity to tax. Denver has a lodger’s tax, a telecommunica-
tions tax, a franchise tax, a car rental tax, a food and
beverage and liquor stores tax, a facilities develop-
ment admissions tax, and an aviation fuel tax, among
others. San Francisco levies a business license tax, a
real property transfer tax, a utility users tax, a parking
tax, and a transient occupancy tax. Chicago has more
than a dozen taxes. Even Atlanta, which lacks home
rule taxing power, imposes a hotel/motel tax, an alco-
hol tax, a public utility tax, a car tax, and an insurance
premium tax, and it has the statutory authority to
impose a host of additional taxes—not just an income
tax and an occupation tax—that it has not exercised.
Boston thus has four types of taxes (including the
property tax) while other cities have from three to
seven times that number. Like the sales and income
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Boston’s reliance on the property tax far exceeds 
that of the other six cities.
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Excluding state aid and property tax receipts, 
Boston’s own-source revenues covered a 
smaller portion of its non-school budget 
than the other six cities.
earmarked for education. The structure of state aid also
differs in significant ways. Boston receives non-educa-
tion state aid from programs that can be—and have
been—altered by the legislature and the Governor. In
recent years, for example, the legislature capped the
amount of aid cities and towns could get from the state
lottery, even though it was established to give localities
an additional source of funds. Chicago, by contrast,
receives much of its state money as of right, not as a
consequence of the state legislature’s annual judgment
about what the city ”needs” and what the legislature
can afford to transfer to it. Under a strict formula
established by state law,
Chicago (along with other 
Illinois municipalities)
receives ten percent of the
income taxes collected by the
state on a per capita basis. If a
sale occurs in Chicago, the
city also receives one percent
of the state sales tax, in addi-
tion to the revenue from its
own sales tax.
Boston is more 
than twice as
reliant on 
property tax 
than the other 
six cities.
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taxes, these targeted taxes present another way that
cities diversify their source of revenue.
Fees. Although the Home Rule Amendment denies
Boston the power to levy taxes without state authori-
zation, the city can assess and collect fees on its own
authority. But the definition of a fee is unusually
constrained in Massachusetts, thereby leaving Boston
with less power than would otherwise appear. For
example, the Supreme Judicial Court construed a state-
authorized additional charge for fire services to high-
cost buildings as a tax rather than a fee. California
courts have taken the opposite stance, broadly con-
struing cities’ ability to impose fees. San Francisco’s
transit fee, imposed on new downtown developments
to provide revenue for the Municipal Railway, was
upheld as a fee, not a tax. In Massachusetts, the oppo-
site result would be likely. Like San Francisco, Denver
and Chicago have substantially relied on fees as a
source of income, enabled in part by these cities’
ownership of assets, such as the airport, that Boston 
no longer controls.
Expenditure Control. The revenue constraints Boston
faces are particularly significant because Boston lacks
control over its expenditures as well. Eighty-percent 
of the city’s expenditures are devoted to schools,
police, fire, debt service, state assessments, retirement
expenses, and health insurance. Many of these are
mandated by the state, and others cannot be signifi-
cantly reduced without making Boston less attractive
to residents, businesses, and visitors. As a result,
Boston has very little discretionary income—and thus
can do little to target its expenditures to pursue any of
its possible futures. Other cities also are constrained in
their ability to control their expenditures. But they are
less restricted than Boston. For example, Boston has
little ability to negotiate with municipal employees
about changes in benefits while Denver has significant
ability to do so. Boston is also more subject than other
cities to state decisions reversing local spending alloca-
tions. The Supreme Judicial Court determined that
Boston’s decision to extend group health insurance to
domestic partners was preempted by state law, while
every other state court decided the same issue the
opposite way. It is ironic that Boston is the only city
without the power to spend city funds to provide
health insurance benefits to domestic partners of city
workers. After all, it is also the only city that must
confer marriage licenses as a matter of state constitu-
tional law to same-sex couples. 
Impact on Planning. Boston’s fiscal structure distorts
local planning not only by restricting the absolute
amount of money the city can raise but also by limiting
the kinds of revenue that that the city can generate. 
It’s no coincidence that Boston is in the midst of a hotel
boom. Attracting hotel guests is more in the city’s
direct financial interest than it previously was because
the city recently received the power to impose a hotel
tax. On the other hand, as a Boston Foundation report
has noted, Boston has no dedicated tax for culture and
the arts, even though arts funding can be an important
means of enhancing tourism as well as have beneficial
impact on the urban experience for residents.8 Cities
that do have a dedicated funding mechanism for
culture and the arts rely on either a sales tax or a hotel
tax. The fact that the hotel tax is one of the few non-
property tax revenue sources that Boston can tap 
for this purpose makes it less likely that the city will 
be willing to do so rather than use it to support the
general budget. San Francisco uses part of its hotel tax
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Boston is empowered to levy a smaller number of 
different taxes than other cities in the study. 
Limited Tools to Spur Development
and Build Affordable Housing
Tax Increment Financing. In addition to the problems
engendered by the city’s imbalanced reliance on the
property tax, the city lacks tools it can use to promote
economic development. Until 2003, state law did not
allow Boston (or other Massachusetts communities) 
to use tax increment financing to help fund redevelop-
ment efforts. Even the current law only allows this
financing tool under comparatively constricted 
circumstances. Chicago used tax increment financing
throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s to develop more than
1.5 million square feet of industrial space. And San
Francisco made extensive use of tax increment financ-
ing as part of its efforts to redevelop the China Basin
area as a major new locus for biomedical research.
Business Improvement Districts. State law has also
made it difficult for Boston to establish Business
Improvement Districts (BIDs). BIDs allow an entity
created by the city and run by local business owners 
to collect additional taxes from commercial establish-
ments and use the additional money for improvements
that will make the area more attractive to shoppers and
commercial tenants. New York City has made exten-
sive use of BIDs to improve many commercial areas,
particularly in Manhattan, and virtually every other
city in our study has experimented with BIDs as well.
Massachusetts’s law in effect permits a district to be
formed only with the unanimous approval of affected
properties because it permits each property holder to
opt out of the fee requirement if they wish. This
requirement, which is not contained in the enabling
legislation that applies to other cities, has proven to 
a serious obstacle to efforts to create a BID in Boston’s
Downtown Crossing.
Inclusionary Zoning and Impact Fees. Boston’s efforts to
fund affordable housing programs by imposing impact
fees on new commercial development and establishing
an inclusionary zoning program for new residential
projects have been limited by the state court’s concern
that these programs were illegal taxes or were other-
wise not allowed by state law. San Francisco has had
more leeway to shape (and reshape) its impact-fee
program, and Denver’s inclusionary zoning 
program has not even been challenged in court
because Colorado’s home rule provisions give cities 
so much more discretionary power than Boston has. 
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to fund the arts, but it also has a wide variety of other
non-property tax levies on which it can rely.
Revenue and Policy. There is no mechanical link
between revenue source and policy outcomes. But
revenue structure generates incentives, whether or not
the decisions the city makes in response to these incen-
tives turn out to be mistaken. The current fiscal struc-
ture is problematic because it makes the city unduly
focused on a single tax in
thinking about how to plan
for its future. The city thus
lacks the proper incentives to
undertake a range of actions
that would promote useful
development. For example,
many people contend that the
future of the city’s economic
health depends on the will-
ingness of universities and
hospitals to maintain a strong
presence in Boston. But with-
out the power to tap revenue
streams other than the prop-
erty tax, it is harder for
Boston than it is for cities like Chicago to see beyond
the loss of property tax revenue generated by these
kinds of tax exempt institutions and focus instead on
the value they provide the city. Yet Boston is powerless
to alter its current incentives, because they have been
imposed by the state. We suspect that the state had no
intention of using its fiscal oversight as a covert means
of shaping local planning decisions. Still, decisions
about the city’s future should be made on the merits of
the alternatives, not because of state-created revenue
rules. This kind of distortion would be reduced if
Boston, like other cities, had a diverse array of income
sources on which to rely and more flexibility as to the
expenditures it must make. That would be true even if
the state expanded Boston’s discretion without increas-
ing the overall amount of revenue the city can raise. 
[Boston] lacks 
the proper
incentives to
undertake a 
range of actions
that would 
promote useful
development.
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New York City’s 42nd Street district was rejuvenated in the 1990s in part through Business Improvement Districts (BIDs).
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Tax-exempt institutions like San Francisco’s Museum of Modern Art (1995) increasingly help to drive urban economies.
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State Authorities. State authorities have considerable
power in Boston. Massport owns an unusually large
amount of land in the city, including Logan Airport.
Thus, unlike Chicago, Atlanta, Denver, and San Fran-
cisco (but like New York City and Seattle), a state
authority, not the city, owns and operates its airport.
Yet control of the airport can be critical because
airports have positive effects on the local economy and
negative impacts on nearby neighborhoods. The state
could give Boston a much greater say in airport policy
than it has now even if Massport continued to own it.
Massport is but one of many state authorities that make
policy for parts of the city. The Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority has a major impact on the city’s develop-
ment, above all through its control of the Big Dig.
Providing Affordable Housing. Boston is engaged in a
number of efforts to maintain and increase its supply
of affordable housing. But state limitations on housing
policy and revenue constraints limit what it can do.
These constraints are more severe than those in other
cities. San Francisco, like Boston, has an affordability
problem. But San Francisco has tools to respond to 
this problem that Boston lacks. Unlike Boston, the city
strictly controls condominium conversions. Chicago
too is an expensive city, but it uses tax increment
financing funds to help subsidize affordable housing
construction. And Cook County, of which Chicago is 
a part, decreases property taxes when multifamily
buildings are rehabilitated and at least 35% of the
apartments are leased to low and moderate income
households. Other innovative strategies, such as the
promotion of limited equity ownership, are not within
Boston’s power to implement.
Education. Development is not simply a matter of land
use policy. The future of Boston depends as well on the
quality of the city’s schools. Unlike other matters, the
Mayor now has an unusual amount of control over the
public schools. But there remain significant limits to
that control. Class size in Boston’s schools is affected
by the substantial number of classes devoted to special
education—significantly more than in other cities.
Provision of special education is a state mandate, and
state funding has fallen short of the needed expendi-
tures. State mandates also require English-language
immersion for the education of students with limited
English proficiency.
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Boston might overcome the legal obstacles surveyed 
in this report, just as it has reversed its declining
fortunes over the last three decades. But the City of
Boston should not be forced to do so. If, in the future,
Boston is less able than other comparable American
cities to respond to the economic and demographic
shifts that are affecting major urban areas, it will oper-
ate at a disadvantage in an increasingly competitive
atmosphere. Boston should be as free as other major
cities in the country are to develop its own plans for
the future. The current legal structure provides Boston
with more disincentives than incentives for doing so.
To enable Boston to profit from its advantages and
address its problems, the state should help Boston 
take control of its future. 
Boston has less power than New York, Chicago,
Atlanta, Denver, Seattle or San Francisco to control its
own destiny. Not every one of these other cities has
each of the following powers – but one or more does.
The important point is that Boston has none of them.
■ The power to amend its city charter without follow-
ing a detailed state-imposed process
■ The power to enact “private law” without explicit
state authorization
■ The power to pass a local law (for example, one that
offers domestic partnership benefits or that sets
municipal employee benefits) that the state has no
power to overrule
■ The power to levy new kinds of taxes without state
permission
■ The power to have a fixed share of a state-wide
income or sales tax or to levy such a tax on its own
■ The power to receive a dependable share of state aid
without an annual legislative authorization
■ The power to borrow money in excess of 5% of the
valuation of the city’s property tax base
■ The power to exercise substantial control of health
and pension costs for city employees
■ The power to design its own governmental structure
for zoning and redevelopment without new state
legislation 
■ The power to own its own airport
■ The power to engage in tax increment financing
without significant state restrictions
■ The power to create business improvement districts
without giving landowners the ability to opt out of
assessments
■ The power to establish linkage and inclusionary
zoning policy without state legislative authorization 
■ The power to control the
number of charter schools
in the city’s school system
■ The power to regulate
municipal elections
■ The power to control city
transportation systems and
infrastructure
■ The power to ensure that
the state can override a
city ordinance only by
making its intention to 
do so clear
As noted above, the state
seems to have recognized 
the virtue of enhancing local
control over one key area of
city policy: education. Boston
is now using its unusually
high degree of control over
its schools in ways that bode well for future gains in
performance. Its pilot school program is an important
example. Significantly, the state has not simply with-
drawn from the education field; it remains an impor-
tant actor when it comes to educational policy in
Boston. But it has usefully permitted Boston to assume
a leading role. 
Conclusion
The state has a
creative role 
to play. 
But Boston 
should not be
subject forever 
to a 
legal structure 
designed in 
another era for 
another kind 
of city.
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As the education structure illustrates, the point of legal
reform is not simply to transfer power from the state to
the City of Boston. The state has a creative role to play.
But Boston should not be subject forever to a legal
structure designed in another era for another kind of
city. Without a legal structure that fosters civic confi-
dence, that decouples the general endeavor of plan-
ning from local dependence on a narrow revenue base,
and that provides the city the full range of economic
development tools that cutting edge planning requires,
Boston will face the 21st century at a disadvantage. 
To spur the kind of rethinking needed to make the
current structure of local government law appropriate
for Boston in the 21st Century, new initiatives are
needed. These initiatives should focus not just on
substantive issues of land use, education, and city
finance but on the legal structure that now defines 
the power of the City of Boston. The changes made in
local government law are likely to be most success-
ful—and most politically powerful—if they are formu-
lated in a democratically responsible manner. One
essential point should underlie these future undertak-
ings. Boston is changing, as everyone who lives or
works or visits here can readily see. Its legal structure
needs to keep up with these changes. 
Boston is now using its unusually high degree of control over its schools in ways that bode well for future gains in performance.
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